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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In the beginning of 1999, the CIO of a Portuguese company in the automobile industry was
debating with himself whether to abandon or to continue supporting the MIS his company had
been using for years. This MIS had been supporting the company’s production processes and
the procurement of resources for these processes. However, in spite of the fact that the MIS
system had been deployed under the CIO’s tight control, the CIO felt strong opposition to the
use of this MIS system, opposition that was preventing the MIS system from being used to its full
potential. Moreover, the CIO was at lost as to how to ensure greater compliance to his control
and fuller use of the MIS system.  Therefore, the CIO decided that he needed someone external
to the company to help him understand the fundamental reasons, technical, social, or cultural,
for the opposition to the MIS system.
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THEORETICAL BASIS FOR THE STUDY
Innovative, organization-transforming software systems are introduced with the
laudable goals of improving organizational efficiency and effectiveness, reducing costs,
improving individual and group performance, and even enabling individuals to work to
their potentials.  However, it is very difficult to get these software systems to be used
successfully and effectively (Lyytinen et al., 1998; Bergman et al., 2002).  Some people
in some organizations resist the changes.  They resist using the systems, misuse them, or
reject them. As a result, the goals are not achieved, intended changes are poorly imple-
mented, and development budgets and schedules are not respected. Misguided deci-
sions and evaluations and less than rational behaviour are often offered as the causes of
these problems (Norman, 2002; Dhillon, 2004). Bergman, King, and Lyytinen (2002)
observe (p. 168), “Indeed, policymakers will tend to see all problems as political, while
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engineers will tend to see the same problems as technical. Those on the policy side
cannot see the technical implications of unresolved political issues, and those on the
technical side are unaware that the political ecology is creating serious problems that
will show up in the functional ecology.” They go on to say (p. 169), “We believe that one
source of opposition to explicit engagement of the political side of RE [Requirements
Engineering] is the sense that politics is somehow in opposition to rationality. This is a
misconception of the nature and role of politics. Political action embodies a vital form of
rationality that is required to reach socially important decisions in conditions of incom-
plete information about the relationship between actions and outcomes.”
The implementation of complex systems, such as enterprise resource planning
(ERP) systems, are rarely preceded by considerations about:
• the system’s degradation of the quality of the employees’ work life, by reducing
job security and by increasing stress and uncertainty in pursuing task and career
interests (Parker and Wall, 1998, pp. 55-70; Davidson and Martinsons, 2002;
Thatcher and Perrewé, 2002);
• the system’s impact on the informal communication that is responsible for friend-
ship, trust, feeling of belonging, and self-respect (Goguen, 1994; Snizek, 1995;
Piccoli and Ives, 2003);
• the power imbalances the system will cause (Bergman et al., 2002; Dhillon, 2004);
and
• the employees’ loss of work and life meaning, which leads to depression and turn-
over (Parker and Wall, 1998, pp. 41-49; Bennett et al., 2003; Davison, 2002).
Recent work by Marina Krumbholz, Neil Maiden, et al. (2000) considers some of
these issues after implementation of ERP systems. Specifically, this work investigates
the impact on user acceptance of ERP-induced organizational transformation that re-
sults from a mismatch between the ERP system’s actual and perceived functionalities
and the users’ requirements, including those motivated by their values and beliefs
(Krumbholz et al., 2000; Krumbholz and Maiden, 2001).
This case study describes an on-site examination of one particular ERP-induced
organization transformation. The prime champion of the ERP system in one company
was surprised by the resistance to the system’s use shown by the employees of the
company. He ended up asking the help of the first author of this case study to under-
stand the sources of this resistance and what to do about it. The present report is a
distillation of the first author’s final report to the champion and of her PhD dissertation
(Ramos, 2000). The focus of the study is on understanding the technological, social, and
cultural reasons of the employees’ resistance against the ERP.
ORGANIZATIONAL BACKGROUND
The reader should consult the organizational charts shown in Figures 1 and 2 in
Annex I as he or she is reading the following narrative. With the exception of the proper
name Isabel, that of the first author, none of the proper names in the narrative, including
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of the company and of software products, is real. However, each proper name does
refer to one real person, company, or product that participated in the events narrated.
One cold morning in February 1999, Pedro was talking with a friend, Sérgio, about
Pedro’s professional path as director of the Information Systems (IS) Department of
ENGINECOMP, a Portuguese subsidiary of a Brazilian company in the automobile
sector. Pedro was not able to decide what else could be done to ensure that MaPPAR,
the information system that was currently supporting the management of production
processes and the procurement of the associated resources, was used to its full poten-
tial.
Pedro had started working for ENGINECOMP at its very beginning in 1992, when
the Brazilian company’s administration decided to build a plant in Europe.  They chose
Portugal for its linguistic and cultural similarity, and for the relatively low salaries that
would be paid to a young and educated workforce. See Annex II for details about the
Portuguese automotive sector and about the company.
Rafael, the president of the Brazilian company, liked to have close control of the
company and of all its branches. He felt especially comfortable with Pedro’s past expe-
rience and thus hired Pedro. He also admired Pedro’s creativity and close attention to
details. Soon, Pedro earned the power to define the work processes, plant design, man-
agement practices, and the information systems that would support the work.
The building of the plant was finished in the beginning of 1993, and the plant was
already manufacturing seven months later. It produced a small but essential component
for the car engines. This component requires a high-quality production line, since even a
small variance in the required measures implies that the product would not be accepted
by the client.
The plant satisfactorily supplied several of the most important automobile builders
in Europe. For each car model, the engineers of the plant, assisted by the client, designed
the specific dimensions and shape of the product to be delivered each time it was or-
dered by the client. Simultaneously, the client and the plant administration negotiated the
percentage of items that the client could cancel or add to an order already in production.
This percentage was very important, since it helped the client to react quickly to a
sudden drop or increase in the demand for that specific car model. For the plant, this
variability added considerable difficulty to production planning, but the aggressive com-
petitiveness of the automotive sector forced acceptance of these margins.
The raw material was shipped from Brazil, where the mines were located. The
material was shipped by sea and arrived at ENGINECOMP three months later. This
delay forced careful stock management and production planning.
Every time a new order arrived, ENGINECOMP’s capability to produce the re-
quired product was carefully assessed.  Following this assessment, the manufacture of
the required product was planned to fit the delivery dates agreed upon with the client,
and production orders were drafted and delivered to the plant. The production processes
were designed in accordance with international norms and the best practices of the
sector. These processes were regularly subjected to quality controls, in both external
and internal audits.
Management of materials acquisition for the plant machinery was also an impor-
tant task, since the plant could never stop or reduce its production from what was
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planned. Three employees of the Logistics Department were assigned to negotiate con-
tinually with actual or potential suppliers. These employees were responsible for keep-
ing the materials at adequate stock levels.
Whenever ordered products were finished, they were packaged and were stacked
in the warehouse for delivery. The finished goods were then delivered to their clients by
ENGINECOMP’s own trucks, by train, or by airplane.
Pedro decided that the complexity of all these activities required an integrated
production management system. He convinced the Brazilian administration to buy a
well-known and highly utilized off-the-shelf system, MaPPAR, to manage all the pro-
duction processes and associated resources. See Annex III for details about MaPPAR.
MaPPAR was configured and deployed under Pedro’s tight control, with the assistance
of the directors of several of ENGINECOMP’s other departments, namely, Engineer-
ing, Quality Control, Finance, Logistics, and Warehousing.
Pedro told his friend, Sérgio, about all the difficulties and successes of the first two
years. Pedro was really proud of his work and of his good decisions. ENGINECOMP
was considered one of the best suppliers of its products in all of Europe and was supply-
ing the most successful automobile manufacturers.
However, MaPPAR was never used to its full potential. In fact, resistance to
MaPPAR’s use seemed to grow steadily since its deployment. In parallel, Pedro’s au-
thority was being continually questioned despite his many past good decisions, his hard
work, and his undeniable contributions to ENGINECOMP’s success.
During 1998, a large fraction of ENGINECOMP’s shares were sold to a German
company. Now, the Brazilian company owned less than 40% of ENGINECOMP’s shares
and was thus losing control over what happened at ENGINECOMP. By the end of
1998, the only relics left of the Brazilian company’s administration of ENGINECOMP
were framed posters in the Brazilian Portuguese language encouraging employees’ cre-
ativity and participation in decision making.
The new administrator, Fritz, distributed his control and support evenly over the
directors of all departments that reported to him including the IS, Engineering, Quality
Control, Finance, Logistics, and Warehousing departments. That is, Fritz treated Pedro
for what Pedro really was, the director of the IS Department, one of many departments.
Pedro resented this treatment, and he believed there was a close link between his loss of
power and the growing opposition to the use of MaPPAR. He wanted to counter this
opposition, but was having “difficulty reasoning unemotionally about the current situation
and past events.” Then, Sérgio told Pedro about a researcher who might be interested
and able to help Pedro analyze the situation. The researcher was Isabel, who entered
the scene in early March 1999.
SETTING THE STAGE
When Pedro first talked with Isabel, he told her about an important movement
within ENGINECOMP against the use of MaPPAR to support production manage-
ment. MaPPAR was very versatile and included modules that could support engineering
tasks, order processing, production planning, assessment of production capabilities, pro-
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duction management, product shipment, management of stocks, accounts payable to
suppliers, accounts receivable by clients, and finances and accounts management.
While MaPPAR was a very complete and powerful system, it was very poorly
used. Employees ignored or resisted using much of MaPPAR’s functionality, preferring
to develop their own small systems and databases to manage only the information rel-
evant to their daily tasks, and used the central MaPPAR database only as the source of
data to feed their own small systems and databases.
Moreover, the employees of the plant were refusing to input timely data about the
tasks they perform. They preferred to defer their inputting until the end of the week or
the month, so they would not lose time during the days. Sometimes, one of the employ-
ees was freed by his colleagues from his normal duties in order to input his and his
colleagues’ data. The problem with this practice was that it became virtually impossible
to track down the sources of the orders in production.
Pedro and Isabel agreed that Isabel would do an on-site study of ENGINECOMP
at work, in search of the fundamental reasons, technical, social, or cultural, for the
opposition to MaPPAR and for the proliferation of small systems and databases. Isabel
would study the work of two departments in ENGINECOMP: the Finance Department
and the Logistics Department. They were the most influential departments of the com-
pany, since they performed essential activities for the company. The Finance Depart-
ment did financial management, and the Logistics Department did customer service and
production planning. Moreover, the employees of these two departments constituted a
majority of MaPPAR’s users.
CASE DESCRIPTION
Isabel spent five months at ENGINECOMP, observing and interviewing all the
employees of the Finance and Logistics departments. Almost every day, Isabel spent
several hours joining or observing employees performing their tasks with or without
support from MaPPAR. She interviewed Carlos and Manuel, the directors of the de-
partments. She also interviewed several middle managers responsible for key activities,
including Fernando, Carlos’s closest collaborator in the Finance Department, and Roberto,
Eduardo, and António, the managers of the Customer Service, Production Planning, and
Purchasing divisions of the Logistics Department.
Isabel also observed and interviewed Pedro and his collaborators in the IS Depart-
ment. She talked also a few times with the German leader, Fritz and she was present at
events such as meetings and training programs. To learn more about MaPPAR, Isabel
consulted the available manuals and technical documentation. She used a demonstration
version of MaPPAR to test some of its functionality on her own.
Below is a department-by-department summary of Isabel’s observations.
Finance Department
The Finance Department was responsible for all financial and accounting tasks of
the company. Carlos, the director of the Finance Department, had sole directorial re-
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sponsibility for the department. However, he delegated supervision of the accounting
tasks to Fernando, a trusted employee with an accounting degree. Fernando had access
to key information and knowledge for performing these accounting tasks.  Fernando’s
access and knowledge, charisma, and core skills made him a privileged ally of Carlos,
the director.
As mentioned, the coordination and control of the Finance Department activities
were responsibilities of Carlos, the director, who kept and centralized all decision mak-
ing. Carlos was a Brazilian sent to ENGINECOMP by the Brazilian company’s admin-
istration. Fritz, the new German leader, was not very comfortable with Carlos’s com-
plete control of the Finance Department.
In the Finance Department, informal communication about work tasks was dis-
couraged. Carlos’s rule was that all communication must be well documented. The
work in the department was organized into well-defined tasks connected by clearly
defined processes, all of which determined the precise responsibilities of each employee.
Employees only occasionally received professional training. The heavy workload left
little time for such training. Moreover, Carlos believed that each employee must perform
simple and repetitive tasks that can be learned by doing. The tasks were distributed
among eight employees, each with limited autonomy. Carlos had his trusted assistant
Fernando, with the accounting degree, supervise the daily routine.
Fernando was seen as a bright and ambitious young man. He was expected more
to comply with rules and procedures than to make autonomous decisions. Fernando
worked hard to serve Carlos’s interests, taking advantage of what he had learned in
courses leading to his degree to further those interests.  Fernando’s actions and informa-
tion were especially useful to Carlos, who as a Brazilian, was not as familiar with Portu-
guese accounting regulations as a Finance Department director should be.
It is I who signs the accounts, the financial reports, and the balance sheets. It is I who signs the
fiscal statements. I am the officer responsible for the company’s accounting. My accounting
degree and my understanding of Portuguese law allow me to give invaluable assistance to the
director. — Fernando
With the help of Fernando, Carlos asserted the strong leadership that Carlos be-
lieved was the guarantor of efficiency and motivation.  Compliance with Carlos’s lead-
ership was the main criterion by which Carlos recruited employees the Finance Depart-
ment.
Interviewed Finance Department employees mentioned some competition for ca-
reer advancement. Finance Department employees were rewarded for accurate comple-
tion of assigned tasks. Failure to comply with rules and procedures was punished. There
was a predominant belief among the employees that autonomous and creative employ-
ees were dangerous in a finance department. This belief was supported by past events
during which fraud was perpetrated. This belief was one of the most important sources
of the motivation to use MaPPAR, which was seen as reinforcing established practices:
I am responsible for one area. So, I work in a well-defined set of tasks and my colleagues have
clearly defined tasks as well. There is no confusion. The system requires that we are specialists
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in our tasks ... hmm ..., and it assures that our director has access to what we do, so we are not
blamed for the mistakes [errors and fraud] of others. — An Employee of the Finance Department
There was little variation in the daily routine of the Finance Department. All needed
information was in MaPPAR’s database, and that information was provided by the other
departments of ENGINECOMP. Moreover, a significant part of the Finance Department’s
work was the production of regular reports and other more timely, but irregular informa-
tion for the other departments. The other departments of ENGINECOMP exerted the
most influence on the Finance Department and served as a buffer between the Finance
Department and the company’s clients and suppliers. However, the Finance Depart-
ment did have some interaction with banks and other similar entities outside the com-
pany. Thus, as can be expected, the Finance Department’s workload was very stable,
with almost no surprises.
The Finance Department employees made heavy use of spreadsheets to produce
the reports the department was required to produce for the other departments. The
reasons offered for use of spreadsheets instead of MaPPAR included:
The [MaPPAR] system reports are not adequate for our management needs. They present too
much data, in a lot of rows, many of which are not useful. It is better to search for the relevant
data using query tools and then to export the data to our spreadsheets where we can treat the
data in the way that suits our objectives. — Fernando
Despite that the use of spreadsheets was sanctioned for the production of only
specific reports, the spreadsheets were being programmed to also perform some func-
tions that the system provided.
There is no need to use the options provided in the menus of the [MaPPAR] system because we
have other tools that do the same. — Another Employee of the Finance Department
Some Finance Department employees regretted the lack of training to use MaPPAR.
At the time MaPPAR was installed, MaPPAR’s implementers did train the Finance
Department employees that were hired specifically to operate MaPPAR. However,
these employees saw the training as too brief and too compressed; they simply could not
absorb all the complex information about MaPPAR’s functionality in such a short time.
Hence, from the beginning, even the MaPPAR operating employees did not understand
MaPPAR’s full capabilities.
It was a one-shot training. I would not even call it training; it was more like a conversation
with the technicians. — Still Another Employee of the Finance Department
After that initial training, employees that had used MaPPAR for a longer time
were responsible for in-house MaPPAR training. Often these trainer employees guided
the trainee employees through only the functionality actually being used. The trainers
usually advised trainees to avoid other MaPPAR functionality, saying that it would be
too complex, inadequate, or better implemented in the programmed spreadsheet.
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All that I know about the system is the result of my efforts to use it. But we have too many tasks
to perform. There is no time left to explore the system, which has too many complexities. And I
say to my colleagues that they should not waste too much time experimenting if they are not
sure of the usefulness of a menu’s options. — Fernando
The Finance Department employees saw this in-house training as a burden. More-
over, Carlos did not encourage his employees to experiment with MaPPAR themselves.
The Finance Department’s history included some catastrophic mistakes, and the
department rumor mill still propagated stories about the stupid mistake that Employee A
or Employee B had made.
To many Finance Department employees, the spreadsheet appeared much easier
and less constraining than did MaPPAR.
All requests for required new or enhanced features for MaPPAR were sent to the
IS Department for implementation. However, many times the IS Department’s response
was to deny a request because of the high costs of the new or enhanced feature. The IS
Department did not want to have to make the same changes to every new version of
MaPPAR that would come out in the future. When a required feature was refused by
Pedro, the director of the IS Department, the requesters were able to easily find
implementers among their colleagues, who had accepted the informal responsibility of
programming the spreadsheets and databases.
In general, Finance Department employees acknowledged the importance of
MaPPAR for their department, since MaPPAR’s integrated modules automatically fed
all the accounts. The institutional authority of the IS Department to define MaPPAR’s
IT support was well accepted.
Logistics Department
The work of the Logistics Department was distributed among three divisions: Pur-
chasing, Customer Service, and Production Planning.  António, the manager of the Pur-
chasing Division, Roberto, the manager of the Customer Service Division, and Eduardo,
the manager of the Production Planning Division, each reported directly to Manuel, the
director of the Logistics Department. Each of the three managers coordinated and con-
trolled the tasks for which he was responsible. The three managers and one director
participated jointly in defining the Logistics Department’s goals and objectives and in
decision making.
Professional training was being delivered to Logistics Department employees on a
regular basis. However, each of the three managers believed that his skills were not
being adequately used and rewarded.  In particular, the Customer Service Division man-
ager, Roberto, felt especially frustrated with this situation. Roberto was seen as a very
dynamic man who learned his job quickly and tried to exceed what was expected from
him. However, Roberto felt that MaPPAR was a significant barrier to his own career
advancement. MaPPAR demanded too much specialization in specific tasks and made
it difficult for one person to have a broad perspective of the business processes. Roberto
believed that this broad perspective was central to providing effective customer service
and to making good decisions.
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Here [at ENGINECOMP], we are evaluated by our ability to solve problems. To be able to solve
problems quickly, we need to know what is going on around here. But, the system is so
unnecessarily complex, and it limits our ability to access relevant information. — Roberto
In fact, it was Roberto who took the initiative of programming the spreadsheets
and databases that were being used by his colleagues throughout ENGINECOMP. He
and two other employees in the Customer Service Division became the informal IS team
of ENGINECOMP, always ready to implement new features adapted to the specific
needs of their colleagues. Roberto’s informal, can-do attitude, his enthusiasm in search-
ing for solutions, and his courage to directly face senior managers provided him with the
admiration of his colleagues, inside and outside the Logistics Department. Roberto proudly
said,
“At this stage of my career, I am independent of the director of the department. I report directly
to the administration [i.e., Fritz].”
There was a widespread belief among all ENGINECOMP’s employees that the
Logistics Department created the company’s positive image among its customers and
the general public. This belief was a source of negotiating power for the Logistics De-
partment and especially for its emerging leader, Roberto.
Especially during the last three months, we ... When I joined the department, we contacted one
client directly, and the others were contacted through our office in Hamburg. In fact, it was not
a real department but an expedition unit. With the recent closing of the office in Hamburg, all
the logistics service is provided by Portugal. Of course, this gave us much more importance
inside the company. — Roberto
Roberto was the manager of one of the three divisions of the Logistics Depart-
ment officially directed by Manuel. Manuel and the managers of the three divisions
believed that the four of them should cooperate to achieve the department’s goals.
However, frequent internal conflicts emerged from the fights over the specific interests
of the department’s divisions. These conflicts emerged from the need to fight for scarce
resources such as budget, human resources, and technology.  The conflicts also arose
from the conflicting influences on work practices exerted by António, the Purchasing
Division manager, and Roberto.
We’re working differently now. We have three autonomous divisions.  We [managers of the
divisions] are responsible for ensuring that our colleagues have what they need to perform
their tasks. Hmmm ... Who coordinates our activities? Well, that is a difficult question. The
department’s director, I guess ... [laughter]. Well, I talk directly with the administration [Fritz].
— Roberto
The Logistics Department office space was designed as an open space into which
any ENGINECOMP employee could enter to seek a problem solution or to demand a
service. The Purchasing Division and the Production Planning Division managers often
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complained about deleterious effects and the pressure caused by the constant interrup-
tions that the open space invited:
There is always pressure from the exterior of the department. This is a drawback of the client-
supplier policy that was adopted internally, this pressure to be continuously available in open
space. We are constantly being interrupted! It is not possible to focus our attention on a single
subject for long and to follow logical and correct reasoning.  — António
Adding to this pressure were the variable and often unexpected requests and prob-
lems posed by suppliers, clients, and ENGINECOMP’s production plant. For example,
as mentioned, the quantities ordered by a costumer could be changed within an agreed
upon percentage after the order was placed and production had started. Logistics De-
partment employees saw flexibility of work practices and procedures, autonomy of de-
cision, and informal communication channels and work relations as key factors to re-
duce the negative impacts of these sudden changes. Moreover, they saw MaPPAR as
reducing their flexibility of action and making their work less interesting. Furthermore,
MaPPAR was forcing them to comply with rules and procedures that reduced their
ability to fulfill the needs of ENGINECOMP’s plant and customers.
Some of these Logistics Department employees referred to MaPPAR as a “sa-
cred cow’” that could not be questioned and that made them “slaves,” requiring most of
their time to input data without “receiving anything in return.” These employees com-
plained also of the poor quality of the MaPPAR reports. They had become highly suspi-
cious of the data stored in the central database.
Because people won’t be wasting their time to explore this and that.  Why should they? When I
want a report and this [MaPPAR] does not give me what I want ...! If only they [IS Department]
made changes to the system! Meanwhile, someone [from the IS Department] decides not to
make them. It is frustrating. — Eduardo
As in the Finance Department, the reports needed to support Logistics Depart-
ment decisions were created in spreadsheets, using data obtained by querying the cen-
tral MaPPAR database. This practice fostered a disconnection between the inputting of
data and the production of reports to support decision making.  The Logistics Depart-
ment employees saw MaPPAR as too complex and too general to effectively support
the details of the department’s activities. Logistics Department employees agreed with
Finance Department employees about the lack of MaPPAR use training and the burden
caused by having to train new employees in the use of MaPPAR.
I find the system too confusing. It is a tool, since it is a standard in a lot of business areas. I think
it does not really help the specific tasks of a specific company in a small country like ours.  —
António
Also, the Logistics Department employees decried the IS Department’s lack of
support and understanding. In response to this complaint, the Logistics Department de-
veloped what Roberto believed was a very effective strategy:
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I have been doing [developing any needed functionality] by myself.  When they [the IS
department] do not want to make the [required] changes to the system, I develop the feature
using the spreadsheets and databases. Nowadays, I do not even ask; I do by myself and help
others with the programming. — Roberto
And he added:
The lack of support from the IS department is creating disinterest in the system. — Roberto
The removal of MaPPAR was seen as an important step to gain more control over
the performed work. Employees wanted to be involved in (i) defining the work prac-
tices, (ii) decision making, (iii) monitoring the system usage, and (iv) defining what were
good and bad usages.
This plant is six years old now. We have learned a lot. We want to be heard! We need a new
system, but this time, we want to be involved! — Roberto
The IS Department
As mentioned, Pedro was the director of the IS department. He kept close at hand
the responsibility to define the operational and management best practices and to ensure
that the information systems were effectively supporting those practices.
Also mentioned, Pedro was very proud of his professional advancement and his
contributions to the success of ENGINECOMP. He considered himself responsible for
the formulation of creative solutions in both work practices and information systems. He
considered that implementing these solutions was a task to be performed in collaboration
with the affected departments. Pedro did not consider himself to be an IS technical
expert. His closest collaborator was the person that knew the used systems in detail and
would do all the programming, parameterization, and users’ support. This collaborator,
José, was a timid man with strong technical skills; he was very competent, but was
hardly considered a leader of opinion and action.
He [José] is very competent. I trust all technical tasks to him — Pedro
José works hard. He always treats us right. The only thing is ... Well, he is very silent [smiling].
— Roberto
José was well accepted by employees from the other departments. These other
employees understood the difficulty José had in providing immediate support to all
MaPPAR users. José’s colleagues from the other departments found José easier to
approach than Pedro and they preferred to talk with José first when a problem arose or
when a change to MaPPAR was needed. However, these employees knew also that
José’s actions were constrained by IS Department policies and his manager Pedro.  At
one point, the managers of departments other than the IS Department were informally
discussing the role of the IS Department. A clear line was emerging between those that
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supported Pedro’s interventional attitude and those that supported José’s helpful and
cooperative attitude. Pedro was aware of this discussion but showed no resentment
towards José.
I know that they [the other employees] would like to get rid of me [laughter]. I defend the
company interests too much. Of course, some other people around here understand that I have
dedicated my life to this company. This happens everywhere and is tough. I do not believe José
could handle all this. — Pedro
Pedro saw José as a very good programmer that would never be able to carry out
the negotiation and political battles inherent in Pedro’s, the IS director’s, job. Moreover,
Pedro knew that José was oblivious to the discussion. Pedro understood this discussion
as an expression of the growing resistance to his own actions. What Pedro really re-
sented was that the German administration and Fritz, in particular, were listening to
these dissenting voices more and more.
The Brazilian administration understood. They hired me for my competence, and they saw what
I did. The new administrator does not know. — Pedro
CHALLENGES FACING THE ORGANIZATION
By the end of the Isabel’s study, the company was undergoing important changes
in its middle management structure. Carlos resigned when a new directorial opportunity
was offered to him back home in Brazil.
Roberto was becoming a key player in the growing importance of the Logistics
Department within ENGINECOMP and in the good image this department projected to
the company’s stakeholders. Manuel, the Logistics Department director, was losing control
over departmental decisions and strategy definition.
The German parent company was using a different ERP system, SAP R/3, and
was now weighing the cost-benefits tradeoffs between upgrading ENGINECOMP’s
MaPPAR to interface with the parent company’s system and deploying SAP R/3 at
ENGINECOMP. Roberto believed that SAP R/3 should be deployed at ENGINECOMP.
Roberto believed also that ENGINECOMP’s six-year use of some ERP system, albeit
different from SAP R/3, gave ENGINECOMP’s middle managers the technological
knowledge to actively participate in the parameterization of SAP R/3. The Finance
Department did not have any preference, and its director was concerned only with the
costs of the new system. Pedro was against the deployment of SAP/R3 because of the
high costs of process reengineering and user training.
Some were suspicious of the data stored in the central database. The reluctance to
use MaPPAR and the lack of time and will to explore MaPPAR’s full functionality
resulted in data being entered late or not at all, with the usual deleterious effects. For
example, it was not always possible to track a client’s order when the client requested
information about his or her order. There were also problems identifying what products
and raw material were in stock.
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The growing trend to use spreadsheet programming to get around the problems
caused by MaPPAR or to implement functionality perceived as not available in MaPPAR
was also reducing the data’s quality. Often, results of outside data processing were not
fed back into MaPPAR.
Important MaPPAR functions, such as requirements planning and capacity plan-
ning, were never utilized and were instead programmed outside MaPPAR, resulting in
unnecessary maintenance costs, lack of control over planning and its results, and a
severe risk of unreliable planning. Pedro’s efforts to document (1) organizational pro-
cesses and resources, (2) the decision to deploy MaPPAR, (3) the MaPPAR process,
(4) MaPPAR’s functionalities and upgrades, and (5) the IT structure of ENGINECOMP
supported his conviction that there was no need to incur the high costs of switching to a
different system, especially when the European economy, including its automotive sec-
tor, was slowing down.  Pedro realized that prevailing with this view would require
gaining allies within ENGINECOMP and gaining the explicit support of Fritz, a near
impossibility. Pedro just did not know what else could be done to get people to see the
importance of abandoning the small databases and in-house programming in favour of a
fuller understanding and use of MaPPAR.
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Figure 1: Organizational Chart until 1999
Figure 2: Organizational Chart after 1999
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APPENDIX II
The Automotive Sector in Portugal
The automotive industry in Portugal generates, per year, more than 6.6 billion Eu-
ros, of which 4.1 billion are in automobile components. It currently employs more than
45,000 workers.  Investment in the automotive component industry continues to attract
a large number of investors and is strongly supported by both Portuguese Government
and European Union funds.
The main areas of automotive production in Portugal include electronics, die cast-
ings, plastic parts, seats, and climate control systems.  Manufacturers, including
Volkswagen, Mitsubishi, Opel, Toyota, and Citroen, assemble more than 240,000 cars
per year in Portugal. Portugal and Spain together make up the third largest car produc-
ing region in Europe. More than 80% of the vehicles produced in Portugal are exported
to other European countries.
Portugal’s automotive component industry, comprising 160 companies, focuses on
engines, engine components, moulds, tools, and other small parts.
ENGINECOMP: Organizational Units,
Business Vision & Mission, International Norms Adopted
The company’s headquarters are in Brazil. The company has plants in Brazil,
Portugal, and Argentina. It has commercial offices in Germany, the United States, Uru-
guay, and Ireland.
Number of Companies 160 
Directly employed staff 37 500 
Turnover (billion Euro) 4 112 
Exports (billion Euro) 2 642 
 Source: AFIA (2002) (http://www.afia-afia.pt/)
Years National Market  Exports Turnover 
1986 200 224 424 
1990 329 798 1.127 
1994 434 1.786 2.220 
1998 1.352 2.319 3.671 
2003 1.460 2.834 4.294 
 
Components Industry Evolution
Source: AFIA (2002) (http://www.afia-afia.pt/)
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ENGINECOMP
Vision
To be acknowledged worldwide as a competitive, high technology manufacturer
that respects the environment.
Mission
To be the principal producer of the XYZ car engine component for the European
market, aiming at complete client satisfaction; to achieve a high return on its invested
capital.
International Norms Adopted: QS 9000/ ISO 9001, VDA 6.1, BS 7750
Number of  Employees 800 
Turnover (Million Euro per year) 30 
Exports (Million Euro per year) 20 
 
